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Predistribution opens up a new set of policy tools but also a
key constraint
Paul Gregg discusses the case for a focus on predistribution: policies that target
income inequality in a preventative sense rather than interventions in terms of higher taxes
and benefits. He highlights the benefits of predistribution; for instance, that the political
space for action is substantially greater than for tax and benefit redistribution, as well as
highlighting a key constraint: indirect interventions often lack the power to overturn the
deeper processes already at work.
Predistribution is a manuf actured word which f eatured heavily in a recent speech by Ed Miliband to a
Policy Network organised conf erence around tackling Britains current economic woes and longer term
challenges. It was coined by Jacob Hacker a prof essor of  polit ical sciences at Yale and is a play on
redistribution but seeks to emphasise the role of  government and wider decision making in reducing
inequality at source.
Economists make a distinction when discussing income inequality between inequality in the primary (or
private) distribution of  work, wages and occupational pensions, and inequality observed af ter the
secondary redistribution ef f ects of  taxes and benef its. Predistribution is thus concerned with the
potential f or inf luencing the primary distribution of  incomes so as to reduce the need f or heavy
intervention in terms of  higher taxes and benef its. It is thus analogous to prevention strategies in say
public health that seek to reduce smoking and improve diets so as to reduce the need f or costly health
interventions later.
It is perhaps not f ully appreciated that the large rise in inequality in the UK in the 1980s and early 90s was
not primarily driven by reductions in higher tax rates or restricting benef its to grow in line with prices
rather than earnings which had been the previous norm. Rather it was driven by a growing polarisation of
work into dual earner and no earner f amilies, with some 20% of  working age f amilies having no earner by
1995 up f rom around 8 per cent in the mid-1970s. This was combined with rapid divergence in wages
between high and low waged earners, such that real wages f or typical workers (those in the middle of  the
wage distribution or median) rose by 23% between 1979 and 1995, but f or those near the bottom (10th
percentile), the rise was just 12% and near the top (90th percentile) wages grew by an impressive 40%.
For the very highest paid, the 1% of  the population with the highest earnings, the growth was
considerably f aster still. In contrast, the growing access to second stage occupational pensions over
and above the state pension saw pension incomes grow rapidly and one of  the poorest groups in
society caught up somewhat with other f amilies.
What surprised many economists over Labour’s period in of f ice was that the return to near f ull-
employment did not see a signif icant reversal of  the wage inequality built up in the 1980s and 90s. In
addition, the boost in the numbers of  graduates and reduction in the numbers leaving school with f ew
qualif ications only halted the growth in the wage gap between better and less educated rather than
reversing the previous trend. So in Labour’s term of  of f ice overall inequality edged up despite major
redistributional ef f orts under tax credits and the Pension Credit. This was primarily af ter 2002 when
wages stagnated f or ordinary workers and the share of  national income going to workers, rather than in
prof its and self -employed incomes, started to f all quite sharply combined with continuing rapid increases
in earnings among top earners.
Also in this period ef f orts to reduce child poverty were hampered by the f act that low earning males had
wage growth not only below the higher paid but also lower paid women. This meant that having a second
earner became increasingly important and single earner couples, where the sole earner is usually the
f ather, saw increased poverty rates despite tax credits. This was combined with a continued growth in
lone parenthhood and so redistributional ef f orts were partly baulked by continuing adverse trends in the
primary distribution of  work and wages.
Of  course, as with many buzz words or phrases the underlying concept is not new. Governments of  all
colours have pursued policies to achieve such ends bef ore. The National Minimum Wage to reduce wage
inequality, welf are to work policies to reduce the number of  working age f amilies with no earner, and
support f or widespread occupational pension schemes all seek to increase incomes f or key groups so
as to reduce the need f or secondary top ups by government.
The current polit ical narrative plays along the lines that the high current def icits and large overall debt
level means that the room f or progressives to act through spending is likely to be severely constrained.
Hence reducing inequality in primary distribution both reduces the need to act through redistribution but
also f rees up resources to address other goals. The polit ics also suggests a sense that the Blair-Brown
era of  being relaxed about the rich getting richer but to use the proceeds of  growth to address poverty
through redistribution has passed.
Predistribution, however, opens up a new set of  policy tools but also a key constraint. The policy tools
over and above tax and benef its are legal regulation, such as minimum wages, and public campaigns or
consumer actions around f airness such as the living wage or f air trade campaigns. There is also the use
of  broader public spending to achieve social goals such as the use of  conditions attached to public
procurement or f ocusing schools on reducing the extent low educational achievement.
Finally, there is the use of  competit ion policy to reduce prices of  goods and services that af f ect the poor
more such as rents, energy and f ood or f raming ef f ects such as opt out rather than opt in pensions
such as NEST to raise self -protection against low incomes in old age.
The key constraint is that they are indirect ef f ects, and indirect interventions of ten lack the power to
overturn the deeper processes already at work. Will a Living Wage campaign backed by public sector
procurement achieve the scale to overturn the steady rise in wage inequality in the UK? Will shareholder
activism combined with rules around binding votes f or remuneration packages of  top executives halt the
rise in pay unrelated to f irm perf ormance?
Furthermore, as with all preventative strategies you will need to be changing the outcomes of  a much
larger group than just those who would have need f or treatment af ter the event and this can of ten mean
the costs are higher than f or waiting f or events to unf old. For example, most of  the lowest paid are not
poor, as they live in f amilies with other earners. Raising pay levels f or all the low paid thus involves f ar
more resources being shif ted than the amounts involved in tax credits targeted to address poverty.
The case f or a f ocus on Predistribution thus rests on three f actors. First, there is a capacity to shif t f ar
larger amounts of  economic resources than can be moved by redistribution in the tax and benef it system
and hence this makes up f or poorer targeting. Second shif t ing these resources comes with at least lit t le
or no economic loss f rom reduced economic ef f iciency. Third the polit ical space f or action here is
substantially greater than f or tax and benef it redistribution.
In terms of  specif ic policies, there are a number of  obvious policy areas but whether they are of
suf f icient scale to address the f orces driving rising inequality is unlikely. Reducing long-term
unemployment, and especially f or young people, is an obvious win as time and again it has been shown
how unemployment damages f uture earnings and employment years af ter a person f irst returns to work.
Expanding the coverage of  occupational pensions through NEST type schemes backed with restrictions
on management f ees chargeable by f und managers to make them better value to low wage savers of f er
hope of  reducing inequality in old age. Limiting the higher prices charged by energy f irms f or payment
systems other than direct debits, such as Charge Keys. Living wage campaigns backed by more extensive
use of  public procurement conditions in contacts etc. All of  these of f er attractive attempts to shif t
inequality in work and wages. But they appear limited in scale and ambition.
More challenging would be boosting employment, but in particular getting these extra jobs f ocused on
groups that the last recovery barely reached such as people in the most deprived areas, the least
educated, the disabled and the over 50s. The potential wins here are large but the key to getting
employment up f or older and disabled workers must be in f irms of f ering f lexibility that suits workers. As
with mothers, right to return af ter illness and right to request part- t ime working are likely to be central to
boosting employment but run counter to the current drive f or f urther labour market deregulation.
Likewise with training, the current high job turnover in low wage sectors discourages both f irms and
workers f rom training, pushing towards long-term and investment f ocused employment contracts is likely
to be central to Predistribution strategy but runs against the current employment regulation model in the
UK. Focusing school resources on reducing Britain’s long tail of  underachievement risks alienating middle
class parents, but tackling low attainment must be central to a Predistribution strategy. Thus a
Predistribution strategy could represent a prof ound challenge to the neo- liberal economic model that has
operated in the UK and US over the last 30 years or a limited rationale to avoid tough choices about
redistribution in tough times.
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